Real gross national product grew rapidly, unemployment finally began to decline, and the rate of inflation moderated. But the coincidence of timing does not necessarily mean that controls are an essential condition for prosperity, or that the August 1971 message was the key that unlocked the floodgates behind which real aggregate demand had been restrained. The major task of this paper is to assess the effect of the controls by comparing the actual performance of the economy with its performance without controls as predicted by an econometric model fitted to the precontrol period. Since the reliability of econometric inflation equations is subject to doubt in light of their inaccurate predictions in the late 1960s, a substantial portion of the paper is devoted to an assessment of the stability of the coefficients in several recently published wage equations. The determination of the four basic macroeconomic magnitudes-nominal (current dollar) income, real output, prices, and unemployment-is usefully separated into three subproblems: (1) the determination of nominal income, (2) the division of that nominal income between real output and prices, and (3) the relationship between real output and unemployment. This paper concentrates on the second problem and assumes that nominal income is determined independently of the control program by past and Before the achievement of the control program can be evaluated, a criterion for its "success" should be established. By my standard, controls can be judged "successful" if the value to society of the reduction in inflation they achieve relative to that which would have occurred without them is greater than the direct and indirect costs imposed by the control program. As I have argued previously, once inflation in the U.S. economy had, in 1968-71, settled down to a rate that was expected to continue at roughly 5 percent per annum, the attempt to reduce it did little good and caused positive harm by redistributing income from debtors to creditors.2 The costs of the control program itself are impossible to measure but must be substantial, mainly in terms of the time lost by corporate executives, small businessmen, and landlords who must make reports, estimate productivity, and plan avoidance strategies, and in terms of the inequities imposed by an arbitrary decision process. Thus, when the small benefits and nonnegligible costs of the program are taken into account, it cannot be deemed a success even though the econometric simulations in this paper do demonstrate that it achieved a significant quantitative reduction in inflation.
current monetary and fiscal policy. Once the paths of real output and inflation with and without the controls are determined, a simple "Okun's law" equation is used to compute the implied alternative paths of the unemployment rate.1
Before the achievement of the control program can be evaluated, a criterion for its "success" should be established. By my standard, controls can be judged "successful" if the value to society of the reduction in inflation they achieve relative to that which would have occurred without them is greater than the direct and indirect costs imposed by the control program. As I have argued previously, once inflation in the U.S. economy had, in 1968-71, settled down to a rate that was expected to continue at roughly 5 percent per annum, the attempt to reduce it did little good and caused positive harm by redistributing income from debtors to creditors.2 The costs of the control program itself are impossible to measure but must be substantial, mainly in terms of the time lost by corporate executives, small businessmen, and landlords who must make reports, estimate productivity, and plan avoidance strategies, and in terms of the inequities imposed by an arbitrary decision process. Thus, when the small benefits and nonnegligible costs of the program are taken into account, it cannot be deemed a success even though the econometric simulations in this paper do demonstrate that it achieved a significant quantitative reduction in inflation.
Can the Data Distinguish among Alternative Models?
Inflation equations were an Achilles' heel in many econometric models during the late 1 960s. The acceleration of inflation was underpredicted consistently and was explained only after it had occurred. The most important cause of weakness was the low variance of the rate of inflation in the pre-1966 period, which disguised the full impact on wages of a sustained period The selection among alternative wage equations for simulation of the wage-price control period can be approached in either or both of two ways. First, the goodness of fit and stability of coefficients of the alternative equations can be examined for several precontrol sample periods, and the "best" equation can be selected for the simulations. Or, second, several simulation tests might be conducted on the period of controls using each of several alternative wage equations. In this paper I have chosen the first approach, both because a time constraint has limited the number of equations that can be simulated and because it yields interesting conclusions in itself. Do the data provide any grounds for choosing among alternative hypotheses, or must we remain agnostic about the best method of specifying effects like those of labor market pressure and past inflation? Are there statistically significant differences in fit between otherwise similar equations using alternative unemployment rates? Is the rejection of the accelerationist hypothesis in most previous wage studies based on statistically significant differences between coefficients? How much do fitted coefficients vary across alternative sample periods? The first part of this paper is devoted to a detailed scrutiny of the Eckstein-Brinner, Gordon, and Perry wage equations to separate the questions that are answered conclusively from those that are not.
CRITERIA FOR COMPARING WAGE EQUATIONS
Although primary interest centers on comparing the statistical significance of alternative labor market and inflation variables, published wage equations differ along numerous other dimensions. Without some standardization of approach a vast number of equations can be estimated, differing in the source of the wage series, the number of quarters over which wage change is defined, the beginning and ending dates of the saniple period, and the precise definition of independent variables. In order to focus the comparisons on alternative hypotheses and minimize the attention to trivial details, the following choices were imposed on all wage equations:
1. Source of wage series. As a measure of wages, Perry used compensation per manhour, whereas I developed a series on hourly earnings corrected for changes in overtime and interindustry employment shifts that was used both in my study and by Eckstein and Brinner. The index used here is identical with that in my earlier paper through 1963:4, and there-after substitutes a more refined index that the Bureau of Labor Statistics has recently begun to publish regularly.5 2. Form of wage change. Both Perry and Eckstein-Brinner expressed the dependent variable in the form of four-quarter changes, and their results exhibit a substantial degree of first-order positive serial correlation. My 1971 estimates used two-quarter changes to reduce positive serial correlation and rejected one-quarter changes due to substantial negative serial correlation. I have subsequently discovered that the extent of negative serial correlation with one-quarter changes is approximately the same as the extent of positive serial correlation with two-quarter changes (DurbinWatson statistics of about 2.5 and 1.5, respectively). Hence I now exhibit estimates for both forms of the dependent variable and assume that the two estimated coefficients for each independent variable bracket the "best" estimate.
3. Sample period. The three studies differ in the starting date of the sample period. While all excluded the Korean war period, Perry chose to begin in 1953:1, Eckstein-Brinner in 1955:1, and I in 1954:1. This study uses 1954:1 both because it represents a compromise and because most of 1953, a period of very low unemployment and only moderate inflation, appears to have been influenced by the Korean war controls. The terminal quarter, 1970:4, is that chosen previously by Eckstein-Brinner and myself and goes two years beyond the Perry sample period; while the sample period could be stretched by inclusion of the first two, precontrol, quarters of 1971, 1 prefer to "save" these for the simulations. 4. Simultaneity. Both the Eckstein-Brinner and Gordon studies (but not Perry's) are subject to criticism for inclusion of current-period price change in the wage equation. In this paper all inflation variables have been redefined to exclude current inflation.
5. For-m of independent variables. All variables are constructed from an identical set of fully revised data.6 Any variable expressed as a level (rather 5. As before, this wage index is adjusted for fringe benefits; the level of the wage index is multiplied by the ratio of compensation of employees to wages and salaries in the national income accounts (Siurvey ol Current Biusitiess, Table 1 6. Sources are listed in my "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," pp. 155-58. The appendix below contains a list (alphabetically by symbol) of all variables used in thlis paper. The Eckstein-Brinner equation is specified exactly as in their paper (p. 4); Gordon's than as a rate of change) is entered directly in the equations with the onequarter wage change as dependent variable, and as a two-quarter average for the two-quarter wage-change equations. All level variables are multiplied by appropriate constants to make coefficients apply to annual rates of change (that is, 0.5 in the two-quarter case and 0.25 in the one-quarter case), and are thus comparable to the published results of Eckstein-Brinner and Perry.7 RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY TESTS Sensitivity tests must allow for interactions among variables, or the results may be misleading. An important conclusion of this section is that Eckstein-Brinner prematurely discarded Perry's hypothesis that a changing labor market structure has shifted the Phillips curve, simply because alternative labor market variables were compared without consideration of possible interactions with Perry's other variables. To provide an "unbiased" appraisal of the effect of the three labor market and inflation hypotheses, each is introduced in three separate trials corresponding to the Eckstein-Brinner, Gordon, and Perry sets of "other" variables. This creates nine combinations for the labor market tests and nine more for the inflation tests.
Labor market variables. The most complicated comparison is among the alternative labor market hypotheses. Table I has nine columns corresponding to the nine possible combinations of the three sets of labor market variables with the three sets of "other" variables. Each coefficient, t-statistic, standard error, and Durbin-Watson statistic is exhibited twice, with that estimated from the equation with the two-quarter wage change as dependent variable exhibited as the top member of each pair and the one-quarter version displayed underneath. The first column displays the Eckstein-Brinner basic equation, and columns (2) and (3) replace the Eckstein-Brinner labor market variables with those of Gordon and Perry, respectively, while retainexactly as in equation (19), p. 124 of the paper noted above (the freely estimated lag weights are used to avoid reestimating the interest rate equation to reflect revised data and to exclude current-period inflation); and Perry's as in equation (3), p. 425, of his paper cited above, with the insignificant secondary employment variable omitted for lack of data. 7. Level coefficients in my 1971 paper (on the disguised unemployment rate, UD, the unemployment rate of hours, UH, and the unemployment dispersion index, DU) must be multiplied by two to be comparable with the estimates presented here. ing all other Eckstein-Brinner variables. A comparison of standard errors for the one-quarter changes (bottom member of each pair) supports the Eckstein-Brinner conclusion that the best-fitting equation is obtained with the conventional unemployment rate alone (hence the "best" standard error in column 1, line 7, is denoted b). This is true whether or not the guidepost dummy is included. However, the comparison for two-quarter changes (top member of each pair) is not so clear-cut. The Eckstein-Brinner approach fits best when the guidepost dummy is included (line 7) but significantly less well than the Gordon variables when the guidepost dummy is omitted (line 8).8 A decision between the two approaches then depends on one's willingness to accept the conclusion that the guideposts conceivably could have reduced the rate of change of wages by as much as 0.7 percent at an annual rate.9
The next set of three columns introduces the alternative labor market variables into equations that otherwise are specified as in my paper. For the one-quarter equations the Gordon labor market variables fit best either with or without the guidepost dummy, with a statistically significant margin in the latter case. In the two-quarter variants the margin is more significant, and the conventional unemployment rate has the wrong sign when added to the equation (column 5, line 11).
Still a different outcome occurs in the final three columns. The Gordon variables fit best both with and without the guidepost dummy, but the Perry approach supplemented by the conventional unemployment rate is marginally better than Gordon-cum-guideposts (column 8, line 7, compared with column 9, line 9). However, either with or without the conventional unemployment rate (1/U), the Perry inverse of the weighted unemployment rate (1/U*) does not come close to statistical significance.
Overall, Table 1 , column 1). The influence of past inflation on wage change is represented by two variables.10 The first (g(1*) is the recent change in the personal consumption deflator (PCD) with a short distributed lag introduced with imposed weights. The second is the "inflation threshold" variable gdT, which is equal to the average annual rate of change of PCD over the past two years when that rate of change is above 2.5 percent, but equal to zero otherwise. The next two columns replace the EcksteinBrinner inflation variables with, respectively, the Gordon and Perry inflation variables in equations that are otherwise identical to column 1. The first Gordon inflation variable is a distributed lag on the rate of change of the same PCD series that Eckstein and Brinner use, but the weights are freely estimated rather than imposed. The second is a distributed lag on the difference between the rate of change of the price of nonfarm output and the price of consumption goods.'1 Perry's variable is simply the rate &f change in the consumer price index (CPI), lagged one period.
A comparison of the first three columns indicates that the EcksteinBrinner inflation variables work marginally better in their equation than the Gordon variables (the difference is not statistically significant), but 10. For variables used in this paper, g indicates the rate of growth. 1 1. This variable reflects the analytic presumption that, with the price of consumption goods unchanged, an increase in the price of nonconsumption goods raises the marginal revenue product of labor and hence tends to pull up wages if labor is paid the value of its marginal product. much better than the Perry CPI variable. On the other hand, the Gordon inflation variables fit significantly better in both the Gordon and Perry equations (columns 4-6 and 7-9, respectively). The most interesting feature of Table 2 is the clear evidence of interaction among variables. The coefficients on all of the inflation variables are substantially higher when introduced into the Eckstein-Brinner equation (first three columns) than in the Gordon or Perry equation. The Eckstein-Brinner approach, which uses the conventional unemployment rate as its only labor market variable, cannot explain the marked wage change in the late 1960s without heavy emphasis on the influence of recent inflation, whereas the Gordon and Perry equations emphasize structural shifts in labor market variables and leave less to be explained by inflation. This is especialiy true of the Perry approach, in which the high coefficient on unemployment dispersion (Table 1, column 9) is offset by low inflation coefficients, and which thus is furthest from supporting the accelerationist hypothesis that the sum of the inflation coefficients is equal to unity.
Another interesting feature of Table 2 is the sensitivity of the coefficients on the first Eckstein-Brinner inflation variable (gd*) to the form in which the equation is fitted. The variable is statistically insignificant in the one-quarter equations, but in the two-quarter equations the coefficient doubles and the t-ratio becomes significant; and in the Eckstein-Brinner published equation based on four-quarter changes, the coefficient doubles again to 0.496 and the t-ratio climbs to 7.3. Yet the two-quarter and four-quarter versions exhibit a substantial degree of positive serial correlation, indicating that both the t-ratios and the size of the coefficient itself are seriously biased.'2 In the more reliable one-quarter versions, which display no significantly autocorrelated disturbances, the entire contribution of past inflation works through the threshold variable, which has particularly unstable coefficients in Table 2 and even more so in Table 3 13. To maintain conformity with my 1971 paper, the distributed lag weights and sum of coefficients on the employers' social security tax variable are constrained. As a crosscheck, the weight on the constrained series of coefficients was estimated freely; it fell consistently into the range 0.8 to 1.0, as compared withl the constraint of 1.0. Also the social security coefficient in Perry's equation consistently falls in the range 0.9 to 1.0 (see Table 3 ).
14. The only exception to this statement is the one-quarter comparison in Table 2 , which indicates that for a given inflation variable Perry's approach for the other variables fits as well as Gordon's. The superiority of the two-quarter Gordon versions suggests that the effect of the personal tax rate, which IS isincluded in the Gordon approach but not in Perry's, may be represented more accurately by a two-quarter average than by a simple one-quarter change. This conjecture is supported by a substantial improvement in fit when the two-quarter personal tax change is introduced into the one-quarter equation (not shown). 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
Further evidence on the choice between past inflation and changing labor market structure as the major explanation of the acceleration in wage increases in the late 1960s is supplied by constraining the sum of the coefficients on past inflation at various values rather than estimating it freely. The basic Gordon one-quarter wage equation has been estimated with the coefficient sum constrained at intervals of 0.1 between 0.0 and 1.2, and this experiment has been repeated for the three sample periods examined in Table 3 Simulations of alternative future economic policies may be too "optimistic" if they assume that the partial adjustment of wage change to inflation evident in most published estimates will persist indefinitely. An alter-native hypothesis is that the elasticity of wage change to the expected rate of inflation is a positive function of the expected rate of inflation itself:
(1) g, t aXt + bgd ,)g(,l
where aX1 represents the other variables multiplied by their respective coefficients. The hypothesis states that, starting from an initial position of low inflation and high unemployment, the elasticity of wage change (b) will be low, but an increase in labor market pressure will raise the rate of wage change not only directly, but also indirectly as higher wage change causes inflation, which increases the expected rate of inflation (gde) and, in turn, raises the elasticity of wage change to expected inflation. The process produces an accelerating inflation whenever the net contribution of the other variables (aX) exceeds a critical level. While numerous specifications of the variable coefficient hypothesis are possible, the data cannot distinguish among several plausible alternatives, and the following simple form was chosen for estimation and simulation pending further research: The estimates and simulations of this particular version of the variable coefficient hypothesis should be viewed as extremely tentative, both because more complex curvilinear relationships seem preferable in principle to (2), and because the distributed lag weights used to estimate gd" from past rates of inflation in (1) and (2) are assumed to be identical to those estimated in the fixed coefficients equation above (Table 3 , column 6). Further research is in progress to allow the distributed lag weights and the variable b coefficient to be estimated simultaneously. When (2) is substituted into (1), the wage equation is identical to those discussed above, with the value of gde replaced by its square. For the "standard" sample period the results of the two-quarter and one-quarter versions of my basic equation are as follows: 18 17. In principle, the constraint refers to the absolute value of g,l,, in order to handle deflation, but none of the experimental simulations below results in a decline of the price level. In comparison with the same equation fitted with a fixed b coefficient, displayed in Table 3 , column 6, the fit of the variable coefficient version is slightly but not significantly better. Coefficients on other variables are very similar. An interesting feature of the variable coefficient version is the increased coefficient and t-ratio of unemployment dispersion, indicating that both an increased reaction to past inflation and changing labor market structure contributed to the inflation of the late 1960s. The coefficient c on the squared inflation term can be interpreted from (2). The elasticity of wage change to expected inflation becomes unity when the expected inflation rate equals l/c, estimated in the two-quarter equation as 1/28.5 (a two-quarter percentage rate of 3.51 and annual rate of 7.02), and in the one-quarter equation as 1/52.1 (a one-quarter rate of 1.92 and annual rate of 7.67).
The equation is identical in all details to that in
While these results must be viewed as tentative and might be sensitive to alternative specifications of the variable coefficient hypothesis, their implications are extremely important. The variable coefficient approach has the advantage that it reconciles (1) the partial adjustment observed in most postwar econometric studies of wage behavior; (2) the steady increase in the size of the partial adjustment coefficient as the sample period is extended into the late 1960s; (3) the accelerationist hypothesis that the rate of inflation will steadily accelerate if the unemployment rate is permanently maintained below a certain "natural" rate; and (4) the relative flatness of the Phillips curve to the right of the natural rate evident in the absence of any apparent tendency to accelerating deflation during the last half of the Great Depression. If this hypothesis is correct, policy makers may have to dampen the pace of the current economic recovery or maintain controls permanently to prevent inflation from accelerating, as illustrated below in the simulations of hypothetical future growth paths.
STABILITY OF COEFFICIENTS IN PRICE EQUATION
In comparison with the complexity and controversy surrounding the choice of the best explanation of wage change, the equation that relates prices to wages is a tranquil oasis. As illustrated in Table 4, 
Simulation Experiments
The simulation experiments are based on a two-equation price-wage model, fitted to the period ending in 1970:4, with the price and wage equations specified exactly as in my 1971 paper (see Table 4 , column 3, above, for price equation; Table 3 , column 6, for wage equation). Since the speci- Since the Price Commission has pushed prices below the level they would have attained under normal price behavior (Table 5 , line 2), the major distributional effect of the control program has been to benefit labor at the expense of business. As indicated on line 4a of Table 5 , the ratio of price to unit labor cost in 1972:2 was 1.54 percent below the level that would have been expected on the basis of actual productivity behavior and past pricesetting relationships. The cyclical recovery of the ratio of price to unit labor cost has been only one-quarter the "normal" (that is, predicted) rate during the four quarters ending 1972:2, and this implies that the controls program has shifted the distribution of income from nonlabor to labor income. Line 4b of Table 5 indicates that with wage rates fixed at their actual value, gross nonfarm private business product would have been $14.3 billion higher without the controls. Section 5 of the table estimates that about 60 percent of this difference, $8.5 billion, directly reduced nonfinancial corporate profits before tax. The remainder consisted of a sizable reduction in nonfarm private nonlabor income outside of nonfinancial corporations and a small reduction in indirect business taxes. Since simulations of the wage-price model into the future (as described below) predict a further increase in the uncontrolled PULC ratio during the current economic expansion, the controls are likely to have a redistributional effect beyond that which has already occurred.23
Effect qf controls on real output and unemployment. The simulations with which the performance of controls is compared in Table 5 implicitly assume a monetary and fiscal policy sufficiently accommodating to have allowed nominal GNP to grow faster in the absence of controls by the estimated effect of the controls (1.85 percent, from Table 5 , line 3b), in order to "pay for" both exogenous real output growth and faster inflation. If, on the other hand, nominal income growth had been held at its actual level, a simulation indicates that inflation would have been virtually the same as reported in Table 5 While this set of predictions may seem gloomy to administration policy makers, it takes on a rosily optimistic glow when set alongside the simulations of the model using the variable coefficient wage equation. In this version any attempt to reduce the rate of unemployment below its natural rate causes inflation to increase, which in turn raises the variable inflation coefficient in the wage equation and causes inflation to accelerate further. Along Path A the unemployment rate is pushed far below the natural rate and by 1986 the annual inflation rate has reached the Brazilian range (14.7 percent) and is still accelerating. Since the natural rate of unemployment in the model is 4.8 percent, Path B is sufficiently conservative to maintain a steady inflation of 3.5 percent. If policy makers attempt to aim for the natural rate and miss slightly, the consequences will not be disastrous. A slightly faster rate of output growth that achieves a permanent 4.55 percent unemployment rate causes an inflation rate that accelerates very slowly, reaching 4.0 percent in 1978 and "only" 5.0 percent in 1985.28 These simulations all make the counterfactual assumption that controls have not been in effect in 1971-72. If it was assumed alternatively that controls had been in effect but had been eliminated on July 1, 1972, and if workers were to base their inflationary expectations of the future on a weighted average of past price change, then the low rate of inflation during the control period would moderate postcontrol wage demands. The lowest dotted line in Figure 3 on the controlled rather than the uncontrolled period. Just as plausible is a post-controls rebound of inflation as business tries to recover its actual profit loss and as labor tries to recover its imaginary wage shortfall.29
Summary and Conclusions
This paper takes a detailed second look at the wage-price model that I published in the first part of 1971 and confirms most of its conclusions. The Phillips tradeoff curve shifted in an unfavorable direction in the 1960s: A given aggregate unemployment rate is now accompanied by a greater divergence than in the 1950s between the unemployment rates of prime-age male workers and those of women and teenagers, and thus signifies a greater excess demand for labor. Perry's unemployment dispersion index measures the shifting structure of the labor market, and the divergence between "total" and official unemployment seems to represent the level of labor demand better than the official unemployment rate by itself. In the long run the rate of inflation is determined primarily by excess labor demand, but the slow adjustment process in the price and wage equations makes the inheritance of recent inflation an important factor during the "short run" of one to three years. The other major factors contributing to the short-run pattern of inflation are (1) a deviation of productivity from its trend value, which tends to occur whenever the rate of output growth varies, and (2) changes in personal and social security tax rates. The response to tax changes has received insufficient attention in previous studies; the average annual rate of inflation was 0.45 percent faster in 1966-69 than it would have been if 1965 tax rates had remained in effect.30
The only major conclusion of the 1971 paper that appears questionable is the assumption of a fixed coefficient on expected inflation in the wage equation. An alternative equation is specified in which this coefficient is estimated to be a linear function of expected inflation and eventually to reach unity when the inflation rate reaches 7 percent. The variable coefficient on expected inflation is similar in spirit to the "threshold inflation" variable of Eckstein and Brinner, but their other major conclusion-that the structure of labor markets has remained unchanged since 1955-is not supported.
Several methodological points emerge from the sensitivity tests. First, the positive serial correlation that has plagued previous wage studies is not present when the dependent variable is expressed as a one-quarter change, instead of a two-or four-quarter change. In most cases coefficients are quite stable when otherwise similar one-quarter and two-quarter versions of wage equations are fitted, but t-ratios are quite different and, as expected in the presence of positive serial correlation, exaggerate the statistical significance of variables in the two-and four-quarter versions. Another important finding is that correlations among independent variables are sufficiently high to require considerable care in comparisons of alternative models; one set of labor market variables may perform better with a particular set of inflation or tax variables but not with some other set.
Since the final version of the wage-price model is the same as that in my 1971 paper, the policy conclusions are the same. A recovery of real output sufficient to bring the unemployment rate down to the 4 percent region (the actual 1956 average rate) will cause the rate of inflation to rise to a pace faster than that in 1969-70. Achievement of the administration's 2.5 percent inflation target without controls requires that the unemployment rate be maintained forever at about 5.2 percent. If, however, the variable coefficients version of the model is closer to the "truth," then the policy implications are considerably more gloomy: Inflation eventually will accelerate at any unemployment rate below 4.8 percent.
The model indicates that the wage-price control program has had a very marked effect in moderating the rate of inflation during its first year, by an amount estimated to be 1.85 percent. A corollary of this achievement is that the controls program is largely responsible for the rapid pace of the economic recovery in 1971-72; the wage-price control program has provided the boost to real demand that the Federal Reserve Board was unwilling to provide in the six-quarter interval between the end of restrictive monetary policy in February 1970 and the imposition of the freeze in August 1971. Without the controls program, unemployment would have risen to 6.2 percent by 1972:2. Most of this achievement should be credited to the Price Commission, which has caused a substantial redistribution of income from business to labor and already has been responsible for a reduction in before-tax profits by $8 billion below the no-controls level in 1972:2, with more to come in the next few quarters as the profit guidelines are breached by a growing number of firms. The achievement of a reduction in inflation is strictly temporary if the controls are lifted soon and if they have no lasting heritage of damping wage demands. Thus it is hard to see that any "success" has been achieved by the temporary control program, since a passing reduction in inflation hardly seems worth the effort that businessmen, lawyers, and government officials have invested in the program. Once again society must face the dilemma that it cannot have full employment and even a 4 percent rate of inflation, much less a 2.5 percent rate, unless (1) controls are maintained permanently, or (2) manpower and social programs succeed in reversing the unfavorable shift in the structure of labor markets by equipping women, teenagers, and disadvantaged workers to fill job vacancies.
I strongly favor the second course of action.
APPENDIX

Symbols and Sources of Data Used in Regressions
THIS APPENDIX PROVIDES a complete list of the symbols used in the regressions; the definition of the variables used; and a key to the abbreviations used to identify the sources. 
Symbols and Sources
